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Abstract
The Note argues that U.S. courts should consider treatment of an apprehended individual in
determining whether to retain jurisdiction. It examines U.S. and international law, and argues that
the U.S., in order to comply with international law, must consider the treatment of an apprehended
individual. It concludes that the U.S. courts must divest themselves of jurisdiction if U.S. agents
have mistreated an apprehended individual in violation of international law.
THE U.S. COURTS AND THE TREATMENT OF
SUSPECTS ABDUCTED ABROAD UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
INTRODUCTION
The continued development of successful international re-
lations among states depends upon each state respecting fun-
damental human rights.' Countries, however, have pushed
aside this ideal by engaging in extraordinary apprehensions
that involve infringements upon individual rights. Individuals
often allege that they were mistreated or tortured when offi-
cials bring them to the prosecuting forum. The acceptance of
such apprehensions on the judicial and executive levels, both
in the United States and abroad, has weakened the foundation
of human rights embodied in international law.4 U.S. courts
1. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 3. The U.N. Charter states that the United Na-
tions' "purpose [is] to promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human rights and for
fundamental freedoms for all." Id.; see W. OLSON, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 294 (7th ed. 1987); Abramovsky & Eagle, U.S. Policy in
Apprehending Alleged Offenders Abroad: Extradition, Abduction, or Irregular Rendition? 57 OR.
L. REV. 51 (1977). National sovereignty and territorial integrity are given paramount
consideration under international law. Id. at 63.
2. M. BAssIouNI, INTERNATIONAL ExTRADImON 239 (1987); see Abramovsky & Ea-
gle, supra note 1, at 52. The two forms of extraordinary apprehensions are abduc-
tions and irregular renditions. d. Abductions are done unilaterally, as officials in the
asylum state are not alerted to the operation nor is their cooperation requested. Id.
Irregular renditions, however, "may be defined as ad hoc agreements ... whereby
either through active cooperation or acquiescence by officials of the asylum state an
individual is removed forcibly to the state of apprehension." Id.
3. See, e.g., United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953
(D.C. Cir. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989); see also United
States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32 (lst Cir. 1981); United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896
(2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Lira, 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 487 (1975); United States v. Tos-
canino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss
denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
4. See 6 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 727 (1968). The custom-
ary method for a state to obtain jurisdiction over a fugitive abroad is by extradition, a
"process by which persons charged with or convicted of crime against the law of a
State and found in a foreign State are returned by the latter to the former for trial or
punishment." Id. The act of one country surrendering a fugitive to another country
is an institutional practice, created for the benefit of the prosecuting state with little
or no regard for the individuals being transported. M. BASsIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL
LAW IN UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE 629 (1986). Extradition requests are not
always granted by the requested state, however, because there is no absolute duty on
nations to comply with such requests; compliance with extradition requests is recom-
mended, but is not mandatory. See, e.g., Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
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are split as to whether a court should consider the treatment of
an apprehended individual in determining whether to exercise
jurisdiction.5
This Note argues that U.S. courts should consider treat-
ment of an apprehended individual in determining whether to
retain jurisdiction. Part I presents the international law appli-
cable to the treatment of individuals apprehended abroad.
Part II examines U.S. case law, setting forth the various courts'
inquiries into the treatment of apprehended defendants. Part
III argues that the U.S. courts, in order to comply with interna-
tional law, must consider the treatment of an apprehended in-
dividual in determining whether to retain jurisdiction. This
Note concludes that U.S. courts must divest themselves of ju-
risdiction if U.S. agents have mistreated an apprehended indi-
vidual in violation of international law.
I. INTERNATIONAL LAW ON APPREHENSIONS AND
HUMAN RIGHTS
Traditionally, the abduction of an individual abroad was
considered a violation of international law.6 The maxim con-
demning abduction evolved from various sources, including
Seizure of Aircraft, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1970, art. 7, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 1646,
T.I.A.S. No. 7192, at 6 (stating that "[t]he contracting state... if it does not extradite
[the offender ... shall] submit the case to its competent authorites for... prosecu-
tion"); Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, opened for signature Mar. 30, 1961, art.
36(2)(b), 18 U.S.T. 1407, 1426, T.I.A.S. No. 6298, at 20, 520 U.N.T.S. 151, 252
(stating that "[ilt is desirable that the offenses . . . be included as extradition
crimes"); see also Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 58 n.27. Recent unsuccessful
extradition attempts by the U.S. government include the request made to Italy for the
hijackers of the cruise ship Achille Lauro and the request made to West Germany for
suspected terrorist Mohammed Hamadei. See Engelberg, U.S. Is Said to Weigh Abduct-
ing Terrorists Abroad for Trials Here, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at 1, col. 4.
5. Compare infra notes 116-63 and accompanying text (discussing cases that con-
sider treatment of detainees) with infra notes 164-202 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing cases that do not consider treatment of detainees).
6. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 278 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F.Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975);
Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D. Jerusalem 1961), aft'd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962). The court in Toscanino stated that "[a] long standing
principle of international law [holds] that abductions by one state of persons located
within the territory of another violate the territorial sovereignty of the second state."
Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 278; seeJ. INTERNOSCIA, NEW CODE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15,
§ 84 (1910). This text states that "[e]very act of a government tending to diminish
the territorial power of another State is illegal, unless it be ordered by the Interna-
tional Community." Id.
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treaties7 and the customary rules under which sovereigns had
conducted themselves when dealing with other states.8 This
international maxim was also incorporated into the domestic
laws of states. 9
Customary international law, however, is dynamic and
may be modified by continued practice within the international
community.' 0  This has been the case with abductions."
Countries have come to regard abductions as acceptable under
7. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23,
1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna Convention]. The preamble to the Vi-
enna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that the signatories to the Vienna
Convention recognize "the ever-increasing importance of treaties as a source of in-
ternational law." Id. at 332; see P. SIEGHART, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN
RIGTrrs 10 (1983). Sieghart states that international law derives from consent, and
that states may express such consent through "an express contract or treaty, [which]
... constitutes a large part of modern international law. Consent may however also
be inferred from the established and consistent practice of States in conducting their
relationships with each other." Id.
8. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTs AND HUMANITARIAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW
1 (1989). The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(the "Restatement (Third)") declares that customary international law "results from
a general and consistent practice of states which is followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 102(2) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)]; see P. SIEGHART, supra
note 7, at 11, 81. Custom may be created by voluntary compliance, but when the
process has been widely accepted it may "be said that the law imposes obligations."
Id. at 7. Customary law, however, may be modified through "[rIeliance by a State on
a novel right or an unprecedented exception to the principle.., if shared in principle
by other states." Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against
Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.CJ. 4, 207 (Judgment of June 27).
9. See G. EZEJIOFOR, PROTECrION OF HUMAN RIGHTS UNDER THE LAW 20 (1964).
The doctrine of incorporation holds that "the rules of customary international law, at
least, are part of the law of the land without any express act of transformation." Id. at
20; see Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 24. In the absence of state law to the contrary, custom-
ary international law is generally considered as "per se part of the law of the land."
See id. at 24-25; Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 64 (stating that "the United
States has recognized explicitly that international law is our law"). Even countries
not a party to a specific instrument may be bound to observe its maxims. T. MERON,
supra note 8, at 1; see Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341
(stating that "[niothing ... precludes a rule set forth in a treaty from becoming
binding upon a [non-party] State as a customary rule of international law").
10. See T. MERON, supra note 8, at 58. In fact, violations of a standard may occur
so often that it becomes difficult to ascertain whether the practices of states reflect
the norm or violations of that norm. Id.
11. See, e.g., Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436
(1886); United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1974) (all permitting the
abductions of individuals overseas). Recent U.S. abductions abroad of Mexican na-
tionals have again thrust this issue into the international spotlight. See Hedges &
Witkin, Kidnapping drug lords, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, May 14, 1990, at 28.
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international law. 2 This changed attitude has accordingly
been reflected in domestic practice.' 3 If the host state does not
formally protest the infringement of its borders, the abducted
individual may not protest.' 4
This modification of international law is undermined by
the use of torture and mistreatment by abducting agents.1 5 As
stated, treaties constitute a integral part of what is considered
to be international law.' 6 Various human rights documents
and treaties have been promulgated that state such mistreat-
ment contravenes international standards of conduct.' 7 In ef-
12. See Attorney General of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5, 59-62, 65-67 (D.
Jerusalem 1961) (discussing cases from United Kingdom, Palestine, and United
States upholding jurisdiction over fugitives captured in other countries), af'd, 36
I.L.R. 277 (Sup. Ct. Isr. 1962). But see Cutting's Case, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 1887
FOREIGN RELATIONS 751, 760 (1888), 2 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 228,
230-31 (1906) (U.S. protest leads to release of U.S. citizens abducted in Mexico).
13. See infra notes 95-202 and accompanying text (absent allegations of torture,
mere abduction of individual does not require official response).
14. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 70. Standing "essentially requires
that the individual possess a right which allegedly has been infringed .... American
courts consistently have denied the individual the right to contest the legality of an
extraordinary apprehension abroad. Standing in these instances has been restricted
to the asylum state." Id. This restriction "has been premised upon the rationale that
provisions such as article 2:4 of the U.N. Charter and article 17 of the O.A.S. Charter
were designed to protect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states." Id. at 70
n.67; seeJ. INTERNOSCIA, supra note 6, at 191. According to section 1107 of this text:
"International Law gives rise to perfect rights and duties only as regards States and
not as regards individuals or associations subordinate to it." Id. § 1107. The court in
Toscanino noted that "[bly and large treaties are to be enforced by governments,
rather than by their individual citizens, and [none of the countries involved] contem-
plated that.., a defendant could personally seek to invoke these treaties." Toscanino,
500 F.2d at 282.
15. See Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. Report
by the Special Rapporteur, Mr. P. Kooymans, appointed pursuant to Commission on Human
Rights resolution 1985/33, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15 (1986) [hereinafter Report by
Special Rapporteur]. According to the United Nations, "[tiorture is now absolutely and
without any reservation prohibited under international law .... If ever a phenome-
non was outlawed unreservedly and unequivocally it is torture .... There [is] no
disagreement whatsoever on the fact that torture is absolutely forbidden." Id. at 1,
3.
16. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 332.
17. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197,
U.N. Doc. A/39/708 (1984) [hereinafter Convention on Torture]; Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975) [hereinafter Declaration on Torture]; Eu-
ropean Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
opened for signature Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Conven-
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fect, it may be possible under international law, through the
enactment of these treaties, that mistreatment of a prisoner
would render an abduction illegal.' 8
The protection of certain basic human rights is a univer-
sally accepted ideal, regardless of any existing historical or cul-
tural differences between states. 19 According to several schol-
ars, the importance of human rights lies in the recognition that
the state exists for the human being, and not that the human
being exists for the state.2 0 Awareness of the importance of
protecting these rights reached its peak in response to viola-
tions committed by sovereign governments during World War
1I.21 After the war, the victorious states sought to introduce
new concepts into international law that would preclude a
reoccurrence of human rights violations, leading to the forma-
tion of such multinational organizations as the United Na-
tions,22 the Organization of American States (the "OAS"),23
tion]; Universal Declaration on Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration]; infra notes 41-
94 and accompanying text (discussing these and other international human rights
instruments).
18. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275-76 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied,
504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
19. L. HENKIN, THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGWrs 1 (1981); see P. DROST,
HUMAN RIGHrs AS LEGAL RIGTs 43 (1965). One commentator notes that the
"source of human rights in international law.., consists of customary rules and...
international agreements." P. DROST, supra, at 43; see G. EzEJIoFOR, supra note 9, at 3.
Ezejiofor defined human rights as "moral rights which every human being, every-
where, at all times, ought to have simply because of the fact that, in contradistinction
with other beings, he is rational and moral." Id.
20. J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST ToR-
TURE 5 (1988); see A. BENNETr, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 232 (1977). Bennett
described human rights as "those areas of individual or group freedom that are im-
mune from governmental interference or that, because of their basic contribution to
human dignity or welfare, are subject to governmental guarantee, protection, or pro-
motion." Id.
21. J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 20, at 5. The authors assert that there
have been two major waves of human rights awareness-the eighteenth century and
the 1930-1940s. Id. From the seventeenth to the eighteenth century, they claim,
such documents as the U.S. Declaration of Independence of 1776 and the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 show the belief that the
"human being was endowed by nature with inalienable fundamental rights which can
be invoked against the government and which must be safeguarded by the govern-
ment." Id. The second wave began in the 1930s and culminated when "the full scale
of the horrors perpetrated by the Nazis came to light." Id.; see P. SIEGHART, supra note
7, at 14; G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 9, at 53.
22. See generally, 1 M. Ku, A COMPREHENSIVE HANDBOOK OF THE UNITED NATIONS
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and the Council of Europe (the "Council").24
A. The United Nations
For over forty years, the United Nations has been at the
forefront of protecting human rights.2 5  The actions of the
United Nations in promoting human rights reflect the con-
cerns of the international community26 and have influenced
96 (1978). The Declaration of Teheran, signed on December 1, 1943, by Franklin
Roosevelt, Joseph Stalin, and Winston Churchill, stated that "we look with confi-
dence to the day when all peoples of the world may live free lives, untouched by
tyranny, and according to their varying desires and their own consciences." 9 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE BULL. at 409 (Dec. 11, 1943). This reiterated the premise underlying
the Declaration by United Nations, signed on January 1, 1942, which stated that the
Allied Nations were
convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend
life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human
rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they
are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces
seeking to subjugate the world.
6 U.S. DEP'T OF STATE BULL. at 3 (Jan. 3, 1942); see generally R. RIGGS &J. PLANO, THE
UNITED NATIONS INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 14-19 (1988)
(describing events surrounding formation of United Nations); N. RODLEY, THE
TREATMENT OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 2 (1987); A. CASSESE, UN
LAw/FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS (1979) (compiling essays regarding U.N. action with re-
spect to human rights and U.N.'s formation). Prior to the end of World War II,
human rights were seen as a matter to be left to the ... domestic jurisdiction
of states ... [because] for most purposes governments could do what they
wished with those under their jurisdiction and international law had no
opinion on the matter, much less any means to act .... It became clear to
the Allied Powers who founded the United Nations that no peace could be
secure where governments were free to break and obliterate their own peo-
ple.
N. RODLEY, supra, at 2; see P. SIEGHART, supra note 7, at 14.
23. See Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T.
2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3, amended, T.I.A.S. No. 6847, Feb. 27, 1967
[hereinafter OAS Charter]. The OAS was formed as a regional faction of the United
Nations. Id. art. 1, 2 U.S.T. at 2417, T.I.A.S. No. 2361 at 26, 119 U.N.T.S. at 50.
The preamble states that the member states are "[r]esolved to persevere in the noble
undertaking that humanity has conferred upon the United Nations, whose principles
and purposes they solemnly reaffirm." Id. preamble, 2 U.S.T. at 2416, T.I.A.S. No.
2361 at 25, 119 U.N.T.S. at 50; see 1 F. GARCIA-AMADOR, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM 70-71 (1983).
24. See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (describing formation of Coun-
cil of Europe)
25. See infra notes 30-69 and accompanying text (discussing U.N. action with re-
spect to human rights).
26. UNITED NATIONS, ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS (25TH ANNIVER-
SARY OF THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS) 5, U.N. Sales No.
E.74.XIV.2 (1973) [hereinafter U.N. ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS].
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27both the constitutions and legislation in many states. In its
charter and in promulgating the following declarations and
resolutions, the United Nations has established itself as the in-
ternational body most devoted to protecting human rights and
eradicating practices of torture and inhuman punishment.28
These measures, however, were not intended to actually estab-
lish new codes of conduct, but rather to recognize those acts
already prohibited under customary international law.29
1. The United Nations Charter
The United Nations Charter (the "U.N. Charter" or the
"Charter"), adopted in 1945 by the victors of World War II,
expressed concern for both the dignity and worth of human
beings.30 Article 2 of the Charter evinces the universal nature
of this document.3 ' Paragraph 6 of article 2 states that mem-
bers of the United Nations should strive to ensure compliance
from all states with the Charter's provisions, even from those
states not parties to the Charter itself.3 2 Drafted in the wake of
World War II, the preamble to the Charter proclaims that the
27. Id. at 17-19. Many states, including the African states of Cameroon, Chad,
and Niger, have expressly referred to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights
(the "Universal Declaration") in their national constitutions. Id. at 17. Many other
states, while not specifically mentioning the Universal Declaration, incorporate its
principles into their constitutions. Id. States that have human rights provisions in
their constitutions include Austria, Belgium, France, the German Democratic Repub-
lic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Switzerland.
See generally PEASLEE, CoNsTrrrIoNs OF NATIONS, vol. III, at 25-932. In addition,
several municipal laws of members nations cite provisions of the Universal Declara-
tion. U.N. ACTION IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGrrs, supra note 26, at 17-18.
28. See N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 18.
29. J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 20, at 1. For example, the Convention
on Torture was "based upon the recognition that the [included] practices [were] al-
ready outlawed under international law. The principal aim of the Convention [was]I
to strengthen the existing prohibition of such practices by a number of supportive
measures." Id. (emphasis in original); see L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 12.
30. See U.N. CHARTER preamble. The Charter states that the peoples of the
United Nations are "determined to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women
and of nations large and small." Id. The U.N. Charter also states that one of the
purposes of the United Nations is to "promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for human
rights and for fundamental freedoms for all." Id. art. 1, 3.
31. Id. art. 2, 6.
32. Id. Article 2, paragraph 6 provides that "[t]he [United Nations] shall ensure
that states which are not Members of the United Nations act in accordance with these
Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and
security." Id.
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members of the United Nations were determined to prevent
another occurrence of the atrocities committed during both
World War I and World War II."
In addition to the preamble, several articles of the Charter
directly address the protection of human rights. In article 1,
the Charter calls upon all states to take appropriate measures
to ensure universal peace by protecting and encouraging re-
spect for human rights.3 4 In addition, articles 55 and 56 pro-
mote universal respect for human rights and fundamental free-
doms by encouraging the United Nations and its member
states to comply with certain standards of human rights.3 5
Scholars now consider these provisions of the Charter to
be part of the foundation of international law.36 The Charter
creates legal obligations that a state violates if it abridges the
33. Id. preamble.
34. Id. art. 1, 2-3. Article 1 states:
The purposes of the United Nations are:
(1) To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats
to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches
of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with
the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of
international disputes or situations which may lead to a breach of the peace;
(2) To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for
the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take
other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;
(3) To achieve international co-operation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for the fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion;
and
(4) To be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attain-
ment of these common ends.
Id. art. 1.
35. Id. arts. 55-56. Article 55 of the Charter states that the United Nations shall
promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Id. art. 55.
Article 56 forces all members to pledge themselves to achieving the purposes set
forth in article 55. Id. art 56.
36. See T. MERON, HUMAN RIGHTs LAWMAKING IN THE UNITED NATIONS 7 (1986).
The author states that the U.N. Charter is "by now accepted into the corpus of cus-
tomary international law." Id.; see T. MERON, supra note 8, at 82. The human rights
principles enumerated in the U.N. Charter have "become a basic component of inter-
national customary law, binding on all states, not only on members of the United
Nations." Id.; see Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L. REV. 1, 17 (1982). But see P. DROST, supra note 19, at
29. Drost questions the legal validity of the U.N. Charter, stating that "it seems im-
possible to admit that these Articles [of the Charter] constitute legal norms, from
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fundamental human rights of individuals.3 7 One scholar has
noted that the language of the Charter, however, is general as
references to fundamental human rights lack clear definition."
Indeed, it appears that the framers of the Charter recog-
nized this vagueness and, thus, included article 68 in the Char-
ter, which provides for the formation of the Commission on
Human Rights. 39 The framers instructed the Commission on
Human Rights to codify in a detailed International Bill of
Rights the generalizations set forth by the Charter.4 0 Three
years after the adoption of the Charter, the Commission on
Human Rights promulgated the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (the "Universal Declaration" or the "Declara-
tion") 41
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
On December 10, 1948, the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the first
part of the International Bill of Rights, as a common standard
of conduct for all nations and peoples.42 The preamble of the
which human rights under positive law can be derived. The. text forbids such an
interpretation." Id.
37. L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 8; see H. CHIU, THE CAPACITY OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS TO CONCLUDE TREATIES, AND THE SPECIAL LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
TREATIES SO CONCLUDED 193 (1986) (discussing sources evidencing intention of
United Nations to create legal obligations through its instruments).
38. See U.N. CHARTER preamble. The Charter's language uses such broad terms
as "fundamental human rights," "equal rights," and "better standards of life." Id.;
see L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 8.
39. U.N. CHARTER art. 68.
40. Id.
41. Universal Declaration, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res.
71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948). Like the U.N. Charter, the importance of the Universal
Declaration cannot be ignored because "the standards laid down in the Universal
Declaration, although perhaps devoid of legal obligation at the time of adoption,
have become part of customary international law as a result of subsequent state prac-
tice." N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 63.
42. G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); see B.
RAMCHARAN, HUMAN RIGHTs: THIRTY YEARS AFTER THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION 3
(1979). The Universal Declaration passed unanimously, with forty-eight member
states approving and eight member states abstaining. U.N. ACTION IN THE FIELD OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 8. It operated as the sole component of the Interna-
tional Bill of Rights for eighteen years, until the U.N. General Assembly enacted the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the International Conven-
tion on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in 1966. International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Jan. 3, 1976, 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. The United
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Universal Declaration notes the extreme importance of pro-
tecting human rights, stating that recognition of these rights
constitutes the foundation of freedom, justice, and world
peace.43 The preamble also refers to the U.N. Charter, noting
that the Charter had reaffirmed the international community's
faith in the dignity and equal rights of all peoples.4 4 In its
thirty articles, the Universal Declaration defines and expands
upon those human rights generally described in the Charter.43
As such, it operates as a standard of international human rights
by which states may measure their compliance.46
The first three articles of the Universal Declaration essen-
tially reiterate the Charter's assertion that human beings are all
equal in dignity, have equal rights, and are free to pursue ful-
fillment of their rights to life, liberty, and personal security. 4
7
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration buttresses these basic
ideals by condemning torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrad-
ing treatment. 48 Furthermore, article 1 1 of the Universal Dec-
States is a signatory to both of these documents but has yet to ratify either. UNITED
NATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS: STATUS OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 3, 27, U.N. Sales
No. E.87.XIV.2 (1987).
43. Universal Declaration, supra note 17, preamble, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N.
GAOR Res. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810.
44. Id.
45. See Universal Declaration, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810.
46. Van Boven, The United Nations and Human Rights: A Critical Appraisal, in B.
RUBIN & E. SPIRO, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY 20 (1979).
47. Universal Declaration, supra note 17, arts. 1-3, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N.
GAOR Res. at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810. Article 1 provides that "[aIll human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and con-
science and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood." Id. art. 1,
G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810. Article 2 states that
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Dec-
laration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth
or other status.
Furthermore, no distinction shall be made on the basis of the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or
under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Id. art. 2, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810. Article 3
provides that "[elveryone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person."
Id. art 3, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810.
48. Id. art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810.
This article states that "[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
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laration provides for the presumption of an individual's inno-
cence until proven guilty and states that defendants have the
right to all guarantees required for a criminal defense.49
Like the U.N. Charter, the legal significance of the Univer-
sal Declaration should not be disregarded. 50  Almost every
state in the world has accepted the Universal Declaration."' In
addition, despite the initial reluctance of some countries to
view it as legally binding, subsequent reliance by states on the
Universal Declaration has rendered it a binding instrument,
imposing obligations for states to follow in their international
relations. 52 According to one scholar, the Universal Declara-
tion has become an authentic interpretation of the U.N. Char-
ter.53 Its provisions, like those of the Charter, bind all states,
not just those who are members of the United Nations.54
3. Instruments Regarding Torture
As noted in the Universal Declaration, one of the most im-
portant facets of human rights is protection from torture and
other ill-treatment.5 5 The International Court of Justice (the
"World Court")5 6 has ruled that prohibitions against torture
49. Id. art. 11, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810.
The guarantees set forth in this article are similar to the due process provisions of the
U.S. Constitution, which state that the state must not "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV.
50. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 701. The Restatement (Third)
recognizes that practices that comprise the framework of customary human rights law
include
virtually universal adherence to the United Nations Charter and its human
rights provisions, and virtually universal and frequently reiterated accept-
ance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights even if only in principle
... [and] general support by states for United Nations resolutions declaring,
recognizing, invoking, and applying international human rights principles as
international law.
d; see supra note 27 (discussing influence of Universal Declaration on States' consti-
tutions and legislation).
51. See L. HENKIN, supra note 19, at 1.
52. See B. RAMCHARAN, supra note 42, at 33, 45.
53. Id. at 37.
54. Id.; see Proclamation of Teheran, 23 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 32/41
(1968). The 1968 International Conference on Human Rights in Teheran led to a
proclamation (the "Proclamation of Teheran") that stated that the Universal Declara-
tion created an obligation for members of the international community to preserve
human rights. Id. art. 2.
55. Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N.
GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810.
56. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 92-96. The International Court of Justice (the
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are part of general international law, binding states regardless
of whether they are parties to specific treaties containing the
prohibition. Although decisions of the World Court lack
precedential value because they have no binding force beyond
the parties and circumstances of each particular case, 58 one
scholar noted that these decisions are respected in resolving
disputes within the international community.59
Toward achieving its goal of eliminating torture, the U.N.
General Assembly passed the Declaration on the Protection of
All Persons From Being Subjected to Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in
1975.60 Almost ten years later, it passed the Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (the "Convention on Torture").6"
These instruments were created to prevent torturous conduct
best typified by the conduct of various sovereigns during
World War 11.62
"World Court") was established in 1945 in conjunction with the United Nations. Id.;
see N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 59 n.49. Article 92 of the U.N. Charter states that the
World Court is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. U.N. CHARTER art.
92. Article 93 provides that all U.N. member states are parties to the World Court
Statute and also permits non-member states to apply to the U.N. General Assembly
to become a party to the Statute. Id. art. 93. Article 94 mandates that U.N. member
states must comply with judgments of the World Court in cases involving them as
parties. Id. art. 94. Immediately following the U.N. Charter, the World Court Statute
details the World Court's organization, its basis of jurisdiction, and its procedures.
Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No.
993, at 25 [hereinafter World Court Statute].
57. See N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 70. One other major ruling of the World
Court found Iran liable to the United States for the detention of the U.S. diplomatic
staff from 1979-80, finding that depriving these individuals of their freedom was in-
compatible with the principles enumerated in both the U.N. Charter and the Univer-
sal Declaration. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Teheran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 91 (Judgment of May 24).
58. World Court Statute, art. 59, 59 Stat. at 1062, T.S. No. 993, at 32. Article 59
of the World Court Statute states that "[tihe decision of the Court has no binding
force except between the parties and in respect of that particular case." Id.
59. See N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 59, 65.
60. Declaration on Torture, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 3452, U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
61. Convention on Torture, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
62. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at
1. The Report of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture (the "Special Rap-
porteur") stated that "[i]t was only after the Second World War that torture-just
like human rights in general-became a matter of international concern and it is only
during the last 20 years that torture has received special attention as a particularly
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The Convention on Torture sets forth a comprehensive
definition of activities that constitute torture.63 This definition
requires that the alleged conduct include the intentional inflic-
tion of mental or physical pain and be administered by a public
official or a person acting in an official capacity. 64 One scholar
described torture as the officially-sanctioned infliction of in-
tense pain, aimed at coercing persons into doing or saying
something against their will.65
Many states ban torture under their domestic law.66 In
heinous violation of human rights since that time." Id. (emphasis in original); see J.
BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 20, at 5; see also N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 8.
Torture, having been abolished as part of the legal process in the late eighteenth
century, was virtually non-existent "until the rise of the Nazi party in Germany in the
1930s, which went so far as to legislate the permissability of 'third-degree' interroga-
tion." Id. This conduct was "perceived to be an aberration that must not be allowed
to recur." Id.
63. Convention on Torture, supra note 17, art. 1(1), G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51.
64. Id. This definition states that
[flor the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by
which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third
person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third
person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating
or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination
of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of
or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person act-
ing in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only
from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id.
65. See N. RODtEY, supra note 22, at 7.
66. See id. at 64. Rodley states that "many constitutions include a prohibition
ag-ainst torture--explicitly or implicitly." Id. According to the Special Rapporteur,
twenty-four states "have incorporated in their constitutions the equivalent to the
right not to be subjected to any cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment." These states include Canada, Japan, Mexico, Spain, the USSR, and the
United States. Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 18, 72. The Special Rapporteur also reported that nineteen states "consider
torture as an offence under their penal or criminal codes." Id. at 20, 83. Addition-
ally, the Restatement (Third) provides that a state violates international law if it prac-
tices, encourages, or condones torture or other ill-treatment as a matter of state pol-
icy. RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 8, § 702.
In fact, torture is so reviled that the universality principle of jurisdiction is ap-
plied to it in dealing with offenders:
states are to consider it among those crimes that they treat as extraditable
.... Unless a state extradites an alleged torturer to another country to
stand trial, it is obliged to institute criminal proceedings against any such
person within its jurisdiction, regardless of the latter's nationality, or of
where the crime was committed.
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1985, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights established a
Special Rapporteur for the Convention on Torture,67 however,
and he received enough incriminating evidence from various
sources detailing the permitted use of torture to send inquiries
to thirty-three specific countries. 6  The U.N. Special Rap-
porteur further noted that although allegations of torture were
frequently made, those countries confronted consistently de-
nied having undertaken such policies.6 9
B. The Organization of American States
Countries in South and Central America, in conjunction
with the United States, signed the OAS Charter in 1948.70 The
member nations reaffirmed the importance of human rights in
accordance with the Universal Declaration. 7' Article 3 of the
N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 47; see Convention on Torture, supra note 17, art. 8, 1,
G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 198, U.N. Doc. A/39/51. The
universality theory of jurisdiction holds that certain crimes are of such a heinous na-
ture that they should be considered hostis humani generis and that any state may appre-
hend and penalize an alleged offender upon conviction. Abramovsky & Eagle, supra
note 1, at 82 n.100. Hostfe]s humani generis is translated into English as "enemies of
the human race." BtAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 664 (Special Deluxe 5th Ed. 1988).
67. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at
5, 22. The Special Rapporteur is to "promote the full implementation of the prohi-
bition under international and national law of the practice of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id. The original draft resolution
included references to "other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment" that were later deleted in the Special Rapporteur's official mandate. Id.; see
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/L.44. Thus, the Special Rapporteur is to restrict his inquir-
ies to examples of torture, but he may also examine instances of cruel or inhuman
punishment that may, "in a further analysis, constitute an act of torture." Report by
Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 5; 23; see N.
RODLEY, supra note 22, at 121-22.
68. Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 15-
16, 56-59 (1986). The Special Rapporteur received information from forty-seven
countries in addition to materials from such organizations as Amnesty International,
the International Commission of Jurists, the World Federation of Trade Unions,
Quaker Peace and Service, and Friends Committee on National Legislation. Id.,
57-58. Of the thirty-three countries considered by the Special Rapporteur, eleven
sent back replies. Id. at 16, 60. In his report, however, the Special Rapporteur
declined to divulge the nations involved. Id.
69. Id. at 3, 16, 16, 63-67; see T. MERON, supra note 8, at 59.
70. OAS Charter, supra note 23, 2 U.S.T. 2394, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S.
3. Members of the OAS are as follows: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Vene-
zuela. T.I.A.S. No. 6847, at 196-203.
71. See OAS Charter, supra note 23. The preamble of the OAS Charter sets forth
that "the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only
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OAS Charter sets forth a reaffirmance of obligations imposed
by treaties and other sources of international law and the fun-
damental rights of the individual.72
In 1985, the OAS promulgated the Inter-American Con-
vention to Prevent and Punish Torture (the "Inter-American
Convention").73 The definition of torture contained in this
document has a broader scope than that contained in the U.N.
Convention on Torture, requiring only that the act be inflicted
for purposes of a criminal investigation, as a means of intimi-
dation, for personal penalty or punishment, or for any other
purpose.74 The preamble of the Inter-American Convention
notes that acts of torture are an offense against human dignity
in accordance with such instruments as the U.N. Charter, the
OAS Charter, and the Universal Declaration.75
Article 1 of the Inter-American Convention states that all
state parties shall prevent and punish torture. 76 Article 5 ren-
ders the admonition against torture absolute by precluding any
justifications for administering torture.77 Under article 6, state
mean the consolidation on [South America] .. .of a system of individual liberty and
social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man." Id. preamble, 2
U.S.T. at 2416, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, at 25, 119 U.N.T.S. at 50; see U.N. AcTIoN IN THE
FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26, at 16.
72. OAS Charter, supra note 23, arts. 3(b), 30), 2 U.S.T. at 2418, T.I.A.S. No.
2361, at 27, 119 U.N.T.S. at 52; see id. art. 11, 2 U.S.T. at 2419, T.I.A.S. No. 2361, at
28, 119 U.N.T.S. at 56 (stating that observance of treaties constitutes standards for
developing peaceful relations among states).
73. Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture, Dec. 9, 1985,
O.A.S.T.S. No. 67, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42 (SEPF), 25 I.L.M. 519 (1986) [herein-
after Inter-American Convention]; see N. RODLEY, supra note 22, at 5.
74. Compare Inter-American Convention, supra note 73, art. 2, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.A/42, at 13, 25 I.L.M. at 521 with Convention on Torture, supra note 17, art. 1(1),
G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51.
75. Inter-American Convention, supra note 73, preamble, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/
Ser.A/42, at 13, 25 I.L.M. at 520.
76. Id. art. 1, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42, at 13, 25 I.L.M. at 521.
77. Id. art. 5, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42, at 14, 25 I.L.M. at 521-22. This pro-
vision states that
[t]he existence of circumstances such as a state of war, threat of war, state of
seige or of emergency, domestic disturbance or strife, suspension of consti-
tutional guarantees, domestic political instability, or other public emergen-
cies or disasters shall not be invoked or admitted as justification for the
crime of torture.
Neither the dangerous character of the detainee or prisoner, nor the
lack of security of the prison establishment or penitentiary shall justify tor-
ture.
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parties must take affirmative measures to prevent and punish
those who administer torture within their jurisdiction by mak-
ing such actions offenses under their domestic criminal laws.78
Finally, article 10 provides that any evidence obtained by tor-
turous methods may not be used against the defendant at
trial.79
In 1982, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is-
sued an advisory opinion and stated that human rights treaties
protected individuals' basic rights, irrespective of their nation-
ality.80 The advisory opinion also stated that parties to these
instruments assume obligations toward the individuals within
their jurisdiction, rather than only to other sovereigns. 8 ' Be-
cause such obligations run to individuals, the opinion noted,
the OAS conventions enabled states to make binding unilateral
commitments not to violate the human rights of individuals.8 2
C. The Council of Europe
The end of World War II saw not only the formation of
the United Nations and the OAS, but also the creation of the
Council of Europe. 3 The European states, wanting to create
78. Id. art. 6, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42, at 14, 25 I.L.M. at 522. Article 6 also
requires states to take similar measures to prevent the infliction of cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment or punishment. Id.; see id. art. 9, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42, at
15, 25 I.L.M. at 522 (mandating that states introduce legislation that guarantees suit-
able compensation for torture victims).
79. Id. art. 10, O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.A/42, at 15, 25 I.L.M. at 523. In accord-
ance with the Inter-American Convention, the OAS recently passed the American
Convention on Human Rights. Organization of American States, Basic Documents
Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System 25, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.71
Doc. 6, rev. 1, 23 Sept. 1987 (1988).
80. Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, IrrE-AM CT. H.R., JUDGEMENTS AND OPINIONS
(ser. A), No. 2 (1982); see T. MERON, supra note 8, at 18.
81. Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, supra note 80, INTER-AM CT. H.R., JUDGMENTS
AND OPINIONS (ser. A), No. 2, at 16.
82. Id. at 17-18.
83. See Statute of the Council of Europe, May 5, 1949, Eur. T.S. No. 1, 87
U.N.T.S. 103. This document stated that European states were "[rieaffirming their
devotion to the spiritual and moral values which are the common heritage of their
peoples and the true source of individual freedom, political liberty and the rule of
law, principles which form the basis of all genuine democracy." Id. preamble, Eur.
T.S. No. 1, at 2, 87 U.N.T.S. at 104; see G. EzEjIOFOR, supra note 9, at 98. A desire for
European unity following World War II led to the Congress of Europe in 1948 at the
Hague. Id. At this meeting it was decided that an organization would be created that
would be "open to all democratically governed European nations which under[took]
to respect a Charter of Human Rights." Id. at 99. The Council of Europe was offi-
cially created in May 1949. Id. at 100.
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European unity following the end of World War II, sought to
protect human rights in an effort to prevent the reappearance
of oppressive European dictatorships." Toward this end, in
1950, the Council passed the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the "European
Convention").85
The preamble of the European Convention states the rea-
son for its promulgation: to begin enforcement of the rights
enumerated in the Universal Declaration.86 The European
Convention contains provisions that are very similar to those
of the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration 87 because
the framers of the European Convention utilized texts that had
been prepared by the U.N. Commission on Human Rights.88
State obligations under the European Convention are abso-
lute.89 Acceptance of its principles is a condition to Council
84. See European Convention, supra note 17, preamble, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222.
The signatories re-affirmed "their profound belief in those Fundamental Freedoms
which are the foundation of justice and peace in the world and are best maintained
.. by an effective political democracy and ... by a common understanding and
observance of the Human Rights upon which they depend." Id; see G. EZEJIOFOR,
supra note 9, at 100.
85. European Convention, supra note 17, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. The European
Convention entered into force on September 3, 1953. Id. at 222 n.l. The current
members of the Council of Europe are as follows: Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Den-
mark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Swe-
den, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. See Eur. T.S. No. 126, at 7-11
(1987).
86. European Convention, supra note 17, preamble, 213 U.N.T.S. at 222-24. See
F. CASTBERG, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHrs 4-5 (1974). The author
states that "[o]ne of the purposes of the [European] Convention is to strengthen
resistance to attempts in all member States to undermine free democracy and thus to
secure greater 'democratic stability.' " Id.
87. Compare European Convention, supra note 17, art. 2(1), 213 U.N.T.S. at 224
with Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 3, G.A. Res. 39/46, 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810 and Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 5, G.A.
Res. 39/46, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810 and Universal Declaration,
supra note 17, art. 4, G.A. Res. 39/46, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810;
and U.N. CHARTER art. 55, c, Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 2, G.A. Res.
217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR Res. at 72, U.N. Doc. A/810.
88. J. BURGERS & H. DANELIUS, supra note 20, at 6.
89. See Statute of the Council of Europe, arts. 3, 8, Eur. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 6, 87
U.N.T.S. at 106, 108. Article 3 states that "[e]very Member of the Council of Europe
must accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons
within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and collaborate
sincerely and effectively in the realisation of the aim of the Council." Id. art. 3, Eur.
T.S. No. 1, at 4, 87 U.N.T.S. at 106. Article 8 provides that "[a]ny Member of the
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membership. 90
Article 3 of the European Convention mirrors the Univer-
sal Declaration's admonitions against torture and inhuman or
degrading treatment. 9' The European Court of Human Rights
(the "Court") has specified that article 3 makes no room for
exceptions, strengthening the concept that the prohibition
against torture is absolute.92 In 1987, the Council of Europe
adopted the European Convention for the Prevention of Tor-
ture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(the "European Convention on Torture").93 Recalling the
provisions of the European Convention, the European Con-
vention on Torture calls for the establishment of a European
Committee for the Prevention of Torture for the purpose of
protecting individuals from torture or other ill-treatment. 94
II. THE ACCEPTANCE AND REJECTION OF UNITED
STATES v. TOSCANINO IN U.S. COURTS
In the 1886 case of Ker v. Illinois,95 the U.S. Supreme
Court established the long-standing rule that forcible abduc-
tions of individuals abroad would not affect a court's ability to
try those brought within its jurisdiction. In Ker, a private inves-
Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be suspended from its
rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to withdraw."
Id. art. 8, Eur. T.S. No. 1, at 6, 87 U.N.T.S. at 108; G. EZEJIOFOR, supra note 9, at 100.
90. See Statute of the Council of Europe, arts. 3, 8, Eur. T.S. No. 1, at 4, 6, 87
U.N.T.S. at 106, 108.
91. Compare European Convention, supra note 17, art. 3, 213 U.N.T.S. at 224,
with Universal Declaration, supra note 17, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. at 73, U.N. Doc. A/810. The Council of Europe also evinced its devotion to
eradicating torture by establishing both the European Commission of Human Rights
and the European Court of Human Rights. European Convention, supra note 17, art.
19, 213 U.N.T.S. at 234. Article 19 states that "[t]o ensure the observance of the
engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the present Convention,
there shall be set up: (1) A European Commission of Human Rights hereinafter re-
ferred to as 'the Commission'; (2) A European Court of Human Rights, hereinafter
referred to as 'the Court'." Id.
92. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976). Scholars con-
sider the European Convention to be an integral part of international law. See P.
SIEGHART, supra note 7, at 27; R. LILLICH & F. NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN
RIGIrrs: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 7-8 (1979); Higgins, The European Convention on
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGTrs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 495 (T. Meron ed. 1984).
93. European Convention for the Protection of Torture and Inhuman or De-
grading Treatment or Punishment, Eur. T.S. No. 126 (1987).
94. Id. at 2.
95. 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
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tigator forcibly abducted and returned a fugitive to the United
States in violation of an existing extradition treaty between the
United States and Peru, the country in which the defendant
had sought asylum. 6 The Court overruled the defendant's
protests to his abduction, finding that forcible abductions were
not a violation of the Due Process Clause and that indictments
would not be dismissed solely on the basis of such abduc-
tions.9 7
The Supreme Court re-affirmed this holding in the 1952
case of Frisbie v. Collins.98 The defendant in Frisbie protested his
abduction from Illinois to face trial in Michigan. 9 The Court
ruled that the defendant's right to due process was not in-
fringed because the defendant's due process rights were satis-
fied when his captors apprised him of the charges against
him."° The holdings of these two cases have been joined
under what is known as the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. 01 Under this
96. Id. at 437-38. Frederick Ker was indicted in Illinois for embezzlement and
larceny, and he escaped to Peru to avoid facing judgment. Id. at 437. U.S. officials
sent the investigator to Peru to obtain the defendant's extradition, but the investiga-
tor could not gain access to the Peruvian government because Chilean forces were
occupying the city. See id. at 438; Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 54 n. 10.
97. Ker, 119 U.S. at 440. The Court held that for mere irregularities in the man-
ner in which he was brought into the custody of the law, "we do not think he is
entitled to say that he should not be tried at all for the crime with which he is
charged." Id. The Court further stated that
[t]here are authorities of the highest respectability which hold that such for-
cible abduction is no sufficient reason why the party should not answer when
brought within the jurisdiction of the court which has the right to try him for
such an offense, and presents no valid objection to his trial in such court.
Id. at 444.
98. 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
99. Id. at 520. The defendant claimed that he had been illegally apprehended in
Illinois and sought to be released under the Federal Kidnapping Act. Id.; see Federal
Kidnapping Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1202 (1988).
100. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522. The Court held that, under Ker, "the power of a
court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he had been brought
within the court's jurisdiction by reason of a 'forcible abduction.' " Id.
101. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir., reh'g denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
The Supreme Court re-affirmed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103 (1975). In Gerstein, law enforcement officials arrested respondent Pugh and an
accomplice in Dade County, Florida. Id. at 105. Officials arrested the men solely on
the basis of a prosecutor's information. Id. The respondents filed a class action suit,
claiming a constitutional right to ajudicial hearing. Id. at 107. The Court held that a
judicial hearing was not a prerequisite to prosecution by information and also stated
that "[n]or do we retreat from the established rule that illegal arrest or detention
does not void a subsequent conviction." Id. at 119 (citing United States v. Ker, 119
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standard, the constitutional right to due process is limited to
the guarantee of a constitutionally fair trial, with no considera-
tion given to how jurisdiction was obtained over the defend-
ant.10 2 ,
This maxim remained unchallenged until 1974, when the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit decided United
States v. Toscanino.' In Toscanino, Uruguayan police, under the
direction of U.S. authorities, abducted the defendant from his
home in Montevideo.' °4 The police blindfolded him, knocked
him unconscious, and drove him to Brazil.' 0 5 For seventeen
days, Brazilian authorities allegedly questioned the defendant
continuously, denying him adequate sleep and nourishment. 0 6
Later, during his criminal prosecution in the United States, the
defendant alleged that the Brazilian officials tortured him dur-
ing this detention and that U.S. authorities were aware of this
torture. 0
7
The Second Circuit held that where a defendant alleges
U.S. 436 (1886); Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519 (1952)); see Immigration and Nationalization
Serv. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 (1984); United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 474 (1980).
102. Frisbie, 342 U.S. at 522; Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 271. In 1972, the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit twice reaffirmed jurisdiction over abducted defendants,
basing these decisions on Ker and Frisbie. In United States v. Vicars, officials arrested
two defendants in the Panama Canal Zone and brought them to Texas to face trial for
narcotics violations based on activities undertaken while they were in Panama. Vicars,
467 F.2d 452, 456 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 967 (1973). One defendant
protested his abduction, but the court cited Frisbie for the proposition that "the
power of a court to try a person for crime is not impaired by the fact that he has been
brought within the court's jurisdiction by means of 'forcible abduction.' " Id. at 455-
56.
A similar result was reached in United States v. Caramian, 468 F.2d 1370 (5th
Cir. 1972). The defendant, facing charges on narcotics violations, fled the United
States on the last day of his trial and disappeared in Bolivia. Id. at 1371. Officials
located Caramian and brought him back to the United States without first requesting
his extradition. Id. The court refused to dismiss his claim based on the denial of a
formal extradition hearing, citing to Frisbie. Id.
103. 500 F.2d 267 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss
denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
104. Id. at 269.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 270.
107. Id. The defendant alleged that he
was kicked and beaten but all in a manner contrived to punish without scar-
ring. When he would not answer, his fingers were pinched with metal pliers.
Alcohol was flushed into his eyes and nose and other fluids.., were forced
into his anal passage. Incredibly, these agents of the United States Govern-
ment attached electrodes to Toscanino's earlobes, toes, and genitals. Jar-
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such acts of torture, a court may be forced to divest itself of
jurisdiction if the alleged acts are outrageous enough to shock
the conscience.' 0 8 The court reasoned that the government
should be unable to realize the product of its own deliberate
and unnecessary misconduct, which in this case was the seizure
of the defendant.'09 The court arrived at its decision by exam-
ining cases in which the Supreme Court had expanded the con-
cept of due process to include protections prior to and during
the defendant's arrest, not just during trial."t 0 The court
stated that the underlying principle of these due process
cases-that the government could not exploit its own illegal
conduct-directly opposed the Ker-Frisbie doctrine."' Thus,
when the government engaged in conduct that shocked the
conscience in order to apprehend or detain the defendant, the
court would not have jurisdiction and must divest itself accord-
ingly."12
ring jolts of electricity were shot throughout his body, rendering him uncon-
scious for indeterminate periods of time but again leaving no physical scars.
Id. The defendant also alleged that U.S. officials were aware of this torture, because
they were admittedly in constant communication with Brazilian police throughout
Toscanino's confinement. Id.
108. Id. at 275. The court also stated that forcible abductions violated article 2,
paragraph 4 of the U.N. Charter and article 17 of the OAS Charter, both of which
protect the territorial integrity of states. Id. at 277.
109. Id. at 272-75. The court stated that "when an accused is kidnapped and
forcibly brought within the jurisdiction, the court's acquisition of power over his per-
son represents the fruits of the government's exploitation of its own misconduct." Id.
at 275.
110. See id. at 272-75. The court opined that due process no longer consisted of
just a fair trial, but now included pre-trial conduct of law enforcement authorities as
well. Id. at 274 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); United States v.
Russell, 411 U.S. 423 (1973); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Miranda v. Ari-
zona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)).
111. Id. at 275; see Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593 (1927). The Court in Ford
stated that Ker would be "inapplicable where a treaty of the United States is directly
involved." Id. at 605-06.
112. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir.), reh'g denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
This shocking the conscience standard was first put forth in Rochin v. California, where
the Supreme Court ruled that evidence of narcotics obtained by pumping the defend-
ant's stomach would not be allowed because such actions by the police "shocked the
conscience." Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). The Toscanino court
believed that the Rochin decision, handed down two months prior to Frisbie, actually
served as an anticipatory erosion of the Ker-Frisbie doctrine. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at
273. The court further stated that "[s]ociety is the ultimate loser when, in order to
convict the guilty, it uses methods that lead to decreased respect for the law." Id. at
274; see United States v. Archer, 486 F.2d 670, 677 (2d Cir. 1973).
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On remand, the district court did not divest itself ofjuris-
diction, finding that the defendant failed to adequately prove
his allegations of torture."' The method of inquiry into the
circumstances of a defendant's arrest, however, is now referred
to by courts as an exception to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine."I4 The
federal courts in the United States have treated the Toscanino
method of inquiry differently, with some circuits analyzing the
circumstances surrounding a defendant's apprehension and
others ignoring the Second Circuit's pronouncement." 5
A. Cases Applying Toscanino
One year after the Toscanino case, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit in United States ex rel. Lujan v. Geng-
ler 116 re-affirmed the requirement in Toscanino that a U.S. court
must divest itself of jurisdiction if government agents engaged
in conduct with respect to the detainee that shocks the con-
science of mankind." 7 In Gengler, the defendant, a native of
Argentina, appealed his conviction based on his abduction
from Bolivia." Because the defendant did not allege torture,
the court distinguished this case from Toscanino. " The court
held that the defendant's mere abduction was not a sufficient
reason to overturn his conviction. 20
The court considered the arresting agents' actions and
stated that the Toscanino holding would not require a court to
divest itself ofjurisdiction in cases where there was mere irreg-
ularity in the arresting agents' actions, but only when outra-
113. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 471 U.S. 1004 (1985); United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 487 (1975); United States v. Matta-Ballesteros, 700 F. Supp. 528,
530-31 (N.D. Fla. 1988).
115. See infra notes 116-63 and accompanying text (setting forth discussion of
cases applying Toscanino analysis); infra notes 164-202 and accompanying text (setting
forth discussion of cases rejecting Toscanino).
116. 510 F.2d 62 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975).
117. Id. at 63.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 66.
120. Id. The court also pointed out that neither Argentina nor Bolivia had con-
tested the defendant's apprehension. Id. at 67. Because the countries did not pro-
test, he was unable to do so himself because of a lack of standing. Id.; see supra note
14 and accompanying text (discussing individuals' lack of standing to protest abduc-
tion).
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geous conduct was alleged.' 2' While noting that it did not
condone illegal government conduct, the court recognized that
indictments could not be nullified by actions that were not suf-
ficiently egregious. 2 2 A concurring opinion explained that ab-
sent allegations of torture or inhuman treatment, the Ker-Fris-
bie doctrine would be followed. 2 3
The Second Circuit continued to adhere to the Toscanino
rule in United States v. Lira.'24 In Lira, Chilean authorities ar-
rested the defendant in Santiago and allegedly tortured him. , 5
The defendant alleged that the local police were acting as
agents of the United States and that U.S. Drug Enforcement
Agency (the "DEA") agents were present during the alleged
administration of torture. 26 The DEA agents who accompa-
nied the defendant on his flight to the United States, however,
denied ever meeting the defendant prior to boarding the
plane. 2 7
The court distinguished this case from Toscanino and re-
fused to release the defendant, finding no evidence that U.S.
agents were aware of his mistreatment. 2 8 Arguments of vicari-
ous U.S. liability also failed, as the court stated that it would be
impossible for DEA agents to monitor the conduct of all for-
eign governments or agencies from which they request aid.' 29
121. United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1975).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 69 (Anderson, J., concurring).
124. 515 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 487 (1975).
125. Id. at 69. The defendant alleged that he was "blindfolded by the Chilean
police, beaten, strapped nude to a box spring, tortured with electric shocks, and
questioned about the whereabouts" of a co-conspirator in the matters leading to his
conviction on narcotics violations. Id.
126. Id. The defendant testified that he heard English spoken during his incar-
ceration but could not identify the source. Id. He also alleged that two DEA agents
were present when he was taken before the Chilean Naval Prosecutor and photo-
graphed, presumably because "some Americans were waiting for his photograph."
Id.
127. Id. at 70. DEA agents also testified that while they had been in contact with
Chilean officials following the defendant's arrest, these conversations were restricted
to the defendant's location and gave no reports of torture. Id.
128. Id. at 70-71. The court held that "the record fails to reveal any substantial
evidence that Chilean police were acting as agents of the United States in arresting or
mistreating [the defendant] or that United States representatives were aware of such
misconduct." Id.
129. Id. at 71. Also, according to the court, extending the Toscanino doctrine to
situations where the U.S. government has no control over foreign police "would
serve no purpose." Id.
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The court further noted that imposing such liability would not
eliminate illegal government conduct, but would actually deter
U.S. law enforcement officials from making lawful requests for
aid from other governments.'"3
The Second Circuit once again applied the Toscanino in-
quiry in United States v. Reed.' The defendant in Reed fled the
United States amid charges of securities fraud and failed to ap-
pear for his trial.'1 2 Agents of the Central Intelligence Agency
(the "CIA") allegedly enticed the defendant to leave Bimini
two months after his disappearance by using a revolver and
threatening language. '3 The agents also allegedly forced him
to spend a thirty minute plane ride face down with a loaded
gun pointed at his head.'34 The court, however, refused to dis-
miss his conviction on the securities charges after applying the
analysis set forth in Toscanino.'35 The court found that the
agents' conduct was not sufficiently egregious to warrant dis-
missal.13 6
The court arrived at this conclusion by comparing the case
to the results in Toscanino and in Lujan.137 It found that the
facts alleged in this case more closely resembled those of Lu-
jan, and, thus, the Toscanino rule would not require the court to
divest itself ofjurisdiction. 3 8 It also stated in a footnote that
because the defendant in Reed was a fugitive when the arrest
and illegal conduct occurred, the case was different from the
situation in Toscanino.'39 According to the court, consideration
of whether a court should divest itself of jurisdiction will only
be applied when jurisdiction is initially obtained by illegal
means and not when the defendant is already a fugitive.' 40
In 1984, the Fifth Circuit applied the Toscanino rule by ex-
amining the circumstances of the defendant's apprehension in
130. Id.
131. 639 F.2d 896 (2d Cir. 1981).
132. Id. at 900.
133. Id. at 901-02.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 902.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 901-02.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 902 n.2.
140. Id.
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United States v. Wilson. 14' This case marked a reversal for the
Fifth Circuit, which had previously refused to acknowledge the
Toscanino holding in four cases that were decided between
1974 and 1976.142
141. 732 F.2d 404 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1099 (1984).
142. See United States v. Lopez, 542 F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v.
Lara, 539 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1976); United States v. Winter, 509 F.2d 975 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 825 (1975); United States v. Herrera, 504 F.2d 859 (5th Cir.
1974). In Herrera, the defendant, a native of Colombia, escaped from an Atlanta,
Georgia prison where he was incarcerated for narcotics violations and returned to his
home in Bogota, Colombia. Herrera, 504 F.2d at 860. Officials arrested the defend-
ant in Peru fifteen months later and detained him for five days before transporting
him to Miami, Florida. Id. Two agents, one from the United States and one from
Peru, accompanied the defendant on this flight. Id. The defendant protested his
return to the United States as violative of Peru's territorial sovereignty under both
the U.N. Charter and the OAS Charter. Id. The court rejected his contention, stat-
ing that "[w]e are bound on the basic proposition by the Ker and Fisbie decisions of
the Supreme Court." Id.
In Winter, the U.S. Coast Guard apprehended and arrested the passengers of a
vessel on which one-half ton of marijuana was found. Winter, 509 F.2d at 977. Two
of those arrested were Jamaican nationals. Id. The arrest took place approximately
thirty-five miles off the coast of Florida. Id. The Coast Guard seized the ship, how-
ever, less than twelve miles off the coast of the Bahamas. Id. at 984. The Jamaican
defendants claimed that their arrest was a violation of Bahamian territoriality, be-
cause the Coast Guard's maximum jurisdiction under article 24 of the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone is only twelve miles. Id. at 984 n.31; see
Convention on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, art. 24, 15
U.S.T. 1606,1612-13, T.I.A.S. No. 5639, at 7, 516 U.N.T.S. 205, 220-21 (1958). The
court upheld jurisdiction over the defendants, citing to its recent decision in Herrera
as having rejected the Toscanino exception. Winter, 509 F.2d at 987-88.
The court also determined that the Ker-Frisbie doctrine could be applied to non-
residents as well as to U.S. citizens, finding no reason to distinguish between the two
groups. Id. at 989. The court realized that it would be inappropriate for aliens to
enjoy more protections than U.S. citizens and, thus, concluded "that Ker-Fssbie ap-
plies to non-resident aliens as well" as to U.S. nationals. Id.
In Lara, the defendant fled the United States while awaiting a jury verdict on
charges of conspiracy to transport automobiles in interstate commerce. Lara, 539
F.2d at 495. Officials arrested him three years later in Panama, and the defendant
unsuccessfully claimed that he was tortured by his captors. Id.
In Lopez, the defendant was convicted on five counts of violating the National
Firearms Registration and Transfer Records Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922 (1988). Lopez, 542
F.2d at 284. After his conviction, he posted bond and was released. Id. He failed to
appear for his sentencing, however, and officials issued a bench warrant for his arrest.
Id. Authorities in the Dominican Republic arrested the defendant when he attempted
to enter the country with fraudulent immigration documents. Id. The Dominican
police held the defendant for eight days before returning him to the United States,
and the defendant alleged that he was tortured during this detention. Id. The de-
fendant further attempted to show that U.S. authorities had instigated the actions of
the Dominican police, but he could not substantiate this assertion with any facts. Id.
The court stated that "the usual rule ... is that a Court's jurisdiction over a defend-
ant cannot be defeated because of the manner in which the defendant was brought
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In Wilson, the defendant, a former CIA officer, was
charged with illegally shipping twenty tons of explosives to
Libya.' 43 Agents of the U.S. government lured him to the Do-
minican Republic and subsequently brought him to the United
States. 44 The court in Wilson noted that the Second Circuit
had narrowed the scope of Toscanino in Lujan and now decided
to consider the method of the defendant's abduction in deter-
mining whether to retain jurisdiction.' 45 Because the defend-
ant made no allegations of torture, though, the court refused
to dismiss his indictment in the absence of such impropriety. 46
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit applied a
before the Court." Id. at 284-85. The court also stated that "so far we have declined
to apply [the Toscanino exception] in this circuit." Id. at 285.
143. Wilson, 732 F.2d at 406-07. Wilson met the shipment in Tripoli and then
directed the explosives to the intended recipients. Id. at 407.
144. Id. at 410. These agents placed Wilson aboard a commercial aircraft bound
for the United States, and federal agents took him into custody immediately after the
plane landed. Id. at 411. He appealed, claiming that the court should dismiss-the
case because his presence before it was the result of fraudulent representations of the
agents. Id.
145. Id. at 411. In light of the narrowing of Toscanino's scope, the court stated
that "our analysis of Ker and its progeny compels the conclusion that unless the gov-
ernment conduct in securing custody of the defendant is shocking and outrageous,
the court should not dismiss the indictment on a due process basis." Id.
146. Id. The court refused to dismiss his indictment, finding that he was merely
the "victim of a non-violent trick," and had not been subjected to any conduct that
could be considered "shocking" or "outrageous." Id.
A federal court in Texas later noted the Fifth Circuit's acceptance of the Tos-
canino doctrine in United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
Mexican border officials arrested the defendant and several accomplices for trans-
porting cocaine into the United States. Id. at 1137. Officials targeted the defendants'
car for inspection after a surveillance camera at the border of the United States and
Mexico took photographs of the defendants passing over the border several times in
a short span. Id. at 1138. Border officials stopped the defendants' car in Texas and
confiscated approximately 237 pounds of cocaine. Id. One of the defendants, Degol-
lado, initially escaped, but the officials traced him to a Mexican hotel, where they
apprehended and allegedly tortured him. Id. The defendant alleged that the Mexi-
can policemen entered the hotel room first, followed by U.S. agents. Id. The court
noted that
[e]ventually, the defendant was placed on the bed with his hands bound be-
hind him. He was being held down by several Mexican officers. The Mexi-
can officers began to interrogate the Defendant while periodically spraying
seltzer water in his nose. Defendant claims that after about 45 minutes, he
was blindfolded and then subjected to long periods of torture by electrical
prod. He insists that at some point, the Mexican police switched to a more
powerful electrical device and told him that this device had been furnished
by the American agents.
Id. The defendant could not identify any U.S. agents as having witnessed the torture.
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version of the Toscanino rule in United States v. Cordero.'47 In
Cordero, Panamanian officials abducted and arrested the de-
fendants, sent them to Venezuela, and then flew them to Pu-
erto Rico to face narcotics charges.' 48  The court found the
treatment afforded to the defendants poor but refused to dis-
miss the defendants' indictments.' 49 In so holding, the court
noted that it was upholding jurisdiction because the conditions
alleged were not egregious enough to warrant dismissal.15 0
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia ap-
plied the Toscanino rule in United States v. Yunis.' 5 1 In Yunis,
agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (the "FBI")
lured the defendant from Lebanon into international waters
and arrested him.' 5 2 The defendant was the leader of a group
that had hijacked a Jordanian airliner in 1985.'"s Following
Id. at 1139. He claimed that he could hear the voice of one of the U.S. agents, but he
could not see the agent after the first forty-five minutes of his detention. Id.
The court examined the facts under the Toscanino rule, and refused to dismiss the
charges against the defendant because there was no evidence that U.S. agents had
participated in the torture. Id. at 1140; see Day v. State, 763 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App. El
Paso 1988); Quintero v. State, 761 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App. El Paso 1988), petition for
discretionary review refused, cert. denied, 110 S.Ct. 90 (1989). In both Day and Quintero,
the court refused to dismiss indictments against defendants captured in Mexico be-
cause they failed to prove shocking conduct by the arresting agents. See Day, 763
S.W.2d at 536; Quintero, 761 S.W.2d at 440-41. As was the case in Lira, U.S. agents
were not held vicariously responsible for the actions of the Mexican police even
though Mexican aid had been requested. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. at 1140.
147. 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981).
148. Id. at 35.
149. Id. at 37.
150. Id. According to one of the defendant's allegations, the defendants were
forced to sleep on the floor of their cells and received little nourishment, barely
enough to stay alive. Id. Despite these contentions, the court did not consider the
treatment egregious enough to warrant divestment ofjurisdiction. Id.
151. 681 F. Supp. 909 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1988), appeal dock-
eted, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
152. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 912-15.
153. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899 (D.D.C. 1988), appeal docketed,
No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). Three U.S. citizens were aboard the plane,
and U.S. officials set out to prosecute the defendant under recently enacted anti-
terrorism statutes. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 912. The two main anti-terrorism statutes
enacted in the United States in the 1980s were the Hostage Taking Act and the Om-
nibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act. See Hostage Taking Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203 (1988); Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2331 (1988). Both of these statutes allow for conviction of any perpetrator, regard-
less of nationality, as long as the victim is a U.S. citizen. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.
§ 1203(b)(l)(A). Congress used the Ker-Frisbie doctrine (U.S. law enforcement offi-
cials may "seize suspected criminals and return them to the U.S. for trial without
violating constitutional protections") as a justification for the abduction of terrorists
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the arrest, the FBI transported the defendant to the United
States. 5
4
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictments against
him, alleging that the arresting agents used excessive force.155
Specifically, the defendant alleged that the agents fractured
both of his wrists while arresting him and that he suffered fre-
quent pain and nausea while aboard the U.S.S. Butte, a U.S.
naval vessel.' 56 The court refused to grant the defendant's
motion, finding that the conduct alleged did not meet the level
of outrageousness required for dismissal under Toscanino.151
The court noted that several circuits had accepted the Tos-
abroad and for the passage of the Antiterrorism Act. Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986: Hear-
ings on H.R. 4294 Before the House of Representatives, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 19 (1986)
(statement of Congressman Ron Wyden); see M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 243
n.128.
These provisions invoke the passive personality doctrine. See Harvard Research in
International Law, Draft Convention on Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 AM. J. INT'L L.
439 (Supp. 1935). The passive personality doctrine focuses on the nationality of the
victim of a crime and holds that a state has the power to protect its nationals from
criminal conduct, even if such conduct is undertaken overseas and/or by a foreign
national. Id. at 578-80. Thus, this principle allows for jurisdiction if the victim is a
national of the prosecuting state. Id.; see McGinley, The Achille Lauro Affair-Implica-
tionsfor International Law, 52 TENN. L. REV. 691, 711 (1985).
This form ofjurisdiction was consistently rejected in the past. See id. at 712; see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 30(2). The Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United
States states that "[a] state does not have jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law at-
taching legal consequences to conduct of an alien outside its territory merely on the
ground that the conduct affects one of its nationals." Id. § 30(2), comment e; see
Blakesly, Jurisdiction as Legal Protection Against Terrorism, 19 CONN. L. REV. 895, 908
(1987). Views toward using this theory ofjurisdiction, however, have recently shifted
with respect to terrorism. See RESTATEMENT (TmRD), supra note 8, § 402, comment g.
The Restatement (Third) acknowledges that the passive personality basis ofjurisdic-
tion has been "increasingly accepted as applied to terrorist and other organized at-
tacks on a state's nationals by reason of their nationality, or to assassination of a
state's diplomatic representatives or other officials." Id.; see Note, U.S. Legislation to
Prosecute Terrorists: Anti-terrorism or Legalized Kidnapping?, 18 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
915, 931 n.65 (1985) (discussing views of both Restatement (Second) and Restate-
ment (Third) with respect to passive personality doctrine).
154. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. at 915.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 913-14. Immediately after being arrested, the defendant complained
of pain in his legs and wrists. Id. at 913. The defendant frequently suffered from
nausea during the voyage and was kept in an eight foot by ten foot stateroom usually
used to store mail. Id. at 914. The U.S.S. Butte travelled the Mediterranean for five
days before reaching a ship equipped with a helicopter to fly Yunis to the United
States. See id. at 915.
157. See id. The court also denied the motion for lack of standing, as "individu-
als, alone, are not empowered to enforce extradition treaties." Id.; see supra note 14
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canino rule as valid, but that no circuit court had divested itself
of jurisdiction under the Toscanino analysis.1 8
The highest court in New York State, however, has dis-
missed a case based on the principle set forth in Toscanino.'59
The New York Court of Appeals decided People v. Isaacson 160 in
1978.16 ' In Isaacson, a police informant lured the defendant
into participating in a narcotics transaction during which he
was arrested by police.' 62 The court reversed the defendant's
subsequent conviction and held, similarly to Toscanino, that po-
lice impropriety could lead to such a dismissal.1 63
(discussing individual's lack of standing to contest both extraordinary apprehensions
and methods used in such captures).
158. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 919 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d 953
'(D.C. Cir. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). The court
stated that "[allthough most circuits have acknowledged the exception carved out by
Toscanino, it is highly significant that no court has ever applied it to dismiss an indict-
ment." 681 F. Supp. at 919 (emphasis in original). The court concluded that the
"defendant has failed either to allege or to show any actions committed by these
officers that meet the standard of outrageousness established by Toscanino and its
progeny requiring this Court to divest itself ofjurisdiction." Id. at 920 (emphasis in
original).
The defendant's due process claims were not entirely dismissed, however, as the
court granted a motion to suppress statements given to the agents while aboard the
Butte. Id. at 921. The court found flaws in the rights afforded to Yunis during his
detention, stating that his treatment fell far short of the standards set forth in Mi-
randa. Id. at 922 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). On appeal, how-
ever, the confession was permitted to be used at trial. United States v. Yunis, 859
F.2d 953, 955 (D.D.C. 1989).
159. People v. Isaacson, 44 N.Y.2d 511, 521, 378 N.E.2d 78, 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d
714, 719 (1978).
160. 44 N.Y.2d 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714 (1978).
161. Id. at 511, 378 N.E.2d 78, 406 N.Y.S.2d 714.
162. Id. at 514-18, 378 N.E.2d at 79-81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715-17. The defendant
was a student at Pennsylvania State University and had no previous arrest record. Id.
at 514, 378 N.E.2d at 79, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 715. At the urging of police, an acquain-
tance of the defendant telephoned him and asked him to participate in a narcotics
transaction. Id. at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S. 2d at 716. The defendant
claimed that the caller "cried and sobbed on the phone, relating that he was facing 15
years to life in Attica [prison], that his parents had turned him away as had his
friends, and that he was looking for ways to make money to hire a decent lawyer." Id.
at 516, 378 N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. After seven such calls, the defendant
agreed to supply the caller/informant with two ounces of cocaine. Id. at 516-17, 378
N.E.2d at 80, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 716. The transaction was to take place in New York
State, just over the border from Pennsylvania. Id. at 517, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406
N.Y.S.2d at 717. Police arrested the defendant during the course of the transaction.
Id. at 518, 378 N.E.2d at 81, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 717.
163. See id. at 521, 378 N.E.2d at 83, 406 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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B. Cases Rejecting Toscanino
Several U.S. courts of appeal have rejected the Toscanino
rule and have refused to consider the methods by which de-
fendants have been apprehended."64 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit appeared to reject the Toscanino
rule in United States v. Marzano. 6 5 U.S. officials charged the de-
fendants in Marzano with taking money from several federally
insured banks and fleeing the United States. 66 Local authori-
ties captured the defendants on Grand Cayman Island and
turned them over to FBI agents.' 67 The defendants made no
allegations of torture but moved to be discharged from cus-
tody because of the method of their apprehension. 68
The court refused to grant the defendants' request, adher-
ing to the Ker-Frisbie doctrine that the courts should not inquire
into the circumstances by which a defendant is brought before
the court.' 69 The court also distinguished Toscanino because
the U.S. agents had not participated in the apprehension. 70
Although the court did not expressly rule on the validity of the
Toscanino doctrine within the Seventh Circuit, it did name sev-
eral circuits that had rejected the Toscanino holding.' 7'
The Ninth Circuit clearly rejected the Toscanino standard
164. See infra notes 165-202 and accompanying text (discussing cases rejecting
Toscanino)
165. 537 F.2d 257, 272 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
166. Id. at 261.
167. Id. at 271.
168. Id. at 271-72. The defendants contested the method by which they were
tricked into leaving Grand Cayman Island. Id. at 270-71.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 272.
171. Id. The court stated that "[w]e note that the Fifth Circuit appears to have
rejected Toscanino, and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits have rejected similar argu-
ments." Id. The court, however, cautioned that in two of these cases the actions
taken by U.S. agents did not rise to the level of outrageousness alleged in Toscanino.
Id.; see Hobson v. Crouse, 332 F.2d 561 (10th Cir. 1964); United States v. Cotten, 471
F.2d 744 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973). In Hobson, the defendant
claimed that he had been unlawfully extradited from North Carolina to face charges
in Kansas. Hobson, 332 F.2d at 561. The defendants in Cotten were convicted in the
United States for conspiracy to defraud the United States and theft of government
property based on actions undertaken in Japan and South Vietnam. Cotten, 471 F.2d
at 745. South Vietnamese police, at the request of U.S. authorities, arrested the de-
fendants and handed them over to U.S. officials for transport to Hawaii. Id. In these
cases, as the court in Marzano noted, the defendants had not alleged outrageous con-
duct. Marzano, 537 F.2d at 272.
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in the 1980 case of United States v. Valot.172 In Valot, the defend-
ant had violated his parole conditions in Hawaii by flying to
Asia, and officials in Hawaii issued a warrant for his arrest. 17
Two years later, he was arrested in Thailand on an unrelated
charge of marijuana possession, and Thai officials incarcerated
him for two years.174 The Thai officials later delivered the de-
fendant to two DEA agents at Bangkok Airport, who then ac-
companied the defendant on a flight back to Hawaii.' 75 The
defendant requested that the U.S. District Court for the Dis-
trict of Hawaii divest itself ofjurisdiction, arguing only that his
apprehension by DEA agents in Thailand was illegal. 76 The
court, however, refused to divest itself in this manner. 77 It
held that precedent within the Ninth Circuit rejected the Tos-
canino approach and that a forcible return to the United States
would constitute no bar to the defendant's prosecution.17 8
In 1981, however, in United States v. Fielding,'79 the Ninth
Circuit appeared to apply an approach similar to that used in
Toscanino.'8 0 In Fielding, the defendant alleged that he was tor-
tured.' 8' The Fielding court cited to an earlier decision in
United States v. Lovato '8 2 as having upheld jurisdiction over a
defendant while no showing of the egregious conduct required
under Toscanino had been made. 8 3 The court in Lovato, how-
ever, held, as did the court in Valot, that circuit precedents
stated that forcible return of the defendant would pose no bar-
172. 625 F.2d 308, 309-10 (9th Cir. 1980).
173. Id. at 309.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. The defendant contended that the arresting agents violated his consti-
tutional due process rights by abducting him. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The court stated that" 'an unbroken line of cases in this circuit [holds]
that forcible return to the jurisdiction of the United States constitutes no bar to pros-
ecution once the defendant is found within the United States.' " Id. (quoting United
States v. Lovato, 520 F.2d 1270, 1271 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975)).
179. 645 F.2d 719 (9th Cir. 1981).
180. Id. at 723. The court explained that even though Peruvian officials had
mistreated the defendant during his captivity, there was no evidence that U.S. agents
had participated in any of the alleged conduct. d. at 724.
181. Id. at 720.
182. 520 F.2d 1270 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975).
183. Fielding, 645 F.2d at 723. The court stated that "[in United States v. Lovato,
we determined that no Toscanino showing had been made." Id.
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rier to prosecution. 84 In addition, the Ninth Circuit's opposi-
tion to use of the Toscanino doctrine was later clarified in United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez.'8 5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit twice
refused to apply the Toscanino standard.'8 6 In United States v.
Darby,'87 a U.S. agent and Honduran officials arrested the de-
fendant in Honduras.' 88 The officials drove the defendant at
gunpoint to an airport and flew him to Florida under the guise
of deportation.'89 The defendant was later convicted of smug-
gling narcotics into the United States. 90 He appealed his con-
viction and alleged that he was illegally abducted from Hondu-
184. 520 F.2d at 1271. The court pointed out that "an unbroken line of cases in
this circuit hold[s] that forcible return to the jurisdiction of the United States consti-
tutes no bar to prosecution once the defendant is found within the United States."
Id. Only in referring to the Second Circuit's use of the Toscanino standard does the
court refer to any form of inquiry. Id. Thus, it appears that the Fielding court is
misreading the Lovato court's discussion of such inquiries.
185. 856 F.2d 1214 (9th Cir. 1988), rev'd, 110 S.Ct. 1056 (1990). U.S. authori-
ties contracted with Mexican officials to capture the defendant and turn him over to
DEA agents. Id. at 1216. The majority only addressed whether a search of the de-
fendant's home in Mexico, where agents lacked a valid search warrant, was reason-
able under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1217-30.
The dissent, however, discussed the apprehension of the defendant, refusing to
inquire into the circumstances involved in his capture and stating that it was rejecting
the Toscanino rule. Id. at 1243-46 (Wallace, J., dissenting). This dissent based its
rejection of Toscanino on two points-that "[tihe majority in Toscanino cited no au-
thority, nor did it provide any sound reasoning, for its expansive holding" and that
the Toscanino court's "rationale has been substantially undermined by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions that have wholeheartedly and repeatedly reaffirmed the
Ker-Fisbie rule." Id. at 1243, 1245. The dissenting judge did state, however, that
"[a]nalyzed under the fifth amendment, Toscanino could be harmonized with other
precedent." Id. at 1244. He clarified this position by stating that
[t]o the extent that Toscanino recognized that aliens may invoke the fifth
amendment to challenge the admission of evidence that was obtained
through means that 'shock the conscience,' [we] find the case unobjection-
able. This rule is consistent with those cases suggesting that the fifth
amendment applies to anyone, citizen and alien alike, subject to criminal
prosecution in the United States.
Id. at 1245.
186. See infta notes 187-94 and accompanying text (discussing Eleventh Circuit's
rejection of Toscanino).
187. 744 F.2d 1508 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985).
188. Id. at 1530.
189. Id. Before the plane proceeded to Miami, it had a stopover in Belize. Id.
While the plane was grounded, the defendant attempted to assert his rights as a Brit-
ish citizen and deplane, but he was allegedly wrestled back into his seat and not per-
mitted to move until the plane landed in Miami. Id.
190. Id. at 1514.
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ras.' 9 ' The court refused to apply the Toscanino analysis, find-
ing that Supreme Court and the former Fifth Circuit precedent
did not accept this rule. 92 Noting that the recent Supreme
Court case of Gerstein v. Pugh ' 93 had reaffirmed the Ker-Frisbie
doctrine, the Darby court questioned Toscanino's validity. 94
The refusal of these federal courts of appeal to accept the
Toscanino doctrine was noted by the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Illinois in Matta-Ballesteros ex rel. Stolar v.
Henman.' 95 The defendant in Matta-Ballesteros escaped from a
U.S. federal prison camp at Eglin Air Force Base in 1971.196
Fifteen years later, he claimed Honduran citizenship and re-
turned to that country. 9 7 In 1986, U.S. officials issued a war-
rant for the defendant's arrest that detailed his involvement in
international drug smuggling. 9 8
The Honduran military captured the defendant at his
home in 1988 by forcibly subduing him with a stun gun and
driving him to an air base.' 99 Members of the U.S. Marshal's
191. Id. at 1530.
192. Id. at 1531. The Eleventh Circuit, created in 1981 and comprised of states
that used to be part of the Fifth Circuit, bases its decisions on precedent from the
Fifth Circuit. See Bonner v. City of Pritchard, Ala., 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11 th Cir.
1981).
193. 420 U.S. 103 (1975); see supra note 101 (discussing facts of Gerstein).
194. United States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1531 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. denid,
471 U.S. 1004 (1985). The Darby court gave several reasons for not applying the
exception. Id. It stated that "the continuing validity of the Toscanino approach is
questionable after the intervening decision in Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), in
which the Supreme Court refused to 'retreat from the established rule that illegal
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent conviction.' " Id. (quoting Gerstein at
119). It also held, however, that it would not apply Toscanino because the defendant
"ha[d] not alleged the sort of 'cruel, inhuman and outrageous treatment allegedly
suffered by Toscanino.'" Id. (quoting United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510
F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1001 (1975)).
The same result was reached in United States v. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d 1214 (1Ith
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 919 (1987). In Rosenthal, DEA agents and Columbian
authorities arrested the defendant, a member of an alleged racketeering and cocaine
smuggling conspiracy, at his home in Colombia. Rosenthal, 793 F.2d at 1225. The
officials flew the defendant to Miami and incarcerated him there. Id. The defendant
protested his capture, but the court upheld jurisdiction, stating that it "has declined
to adopt the Toscanino approach." Id. at 1232.
195. 697 F. Supp. 1040 (S.D. I11. 1988), aff'd, 896 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Service then accompanied him on a flight to New York.2 0 Of-
ficials arrested the defendant when the plane landed and trans-
ported him to a U.S. penitentiary in Illinois.2 0 ' The court de-
clined the defendant's motions for dismissal based on this
method of apprehension, noting that several circuit courts had
rejected the Toscanino rule and that no case had ever been dis-
missed based on this argument.20 2
III. COURTS SHOULD CONSIDER THE METHOD BY
WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL IS APPREHENDED
The Toscanino standard of inquiry requires that a court ex-
amine the methods by which a defendant is brought within its
jurisdiction.0 3 In light of the increased use of such an inquiry
in the federal courts of appeal and the prohibitions of torture
contained in several multinational instruments, U.S. courts
should uniformly adopt the Toscanino inquiry and consider the
circumstances involved in extraterritorial apprehensions. 0 4 In
order to promote human rights, U.S. courts should do more
than merely engage in such inquiry; they should also divest
themselves of jurisdiction when the conduct of arresting
agents is egregious enough to shock the conscience. 0 5 By di-
vesting themselves in this manner, courts are likely to dissuade
U.S. agents from torturing suspects both during and after ap-
prehension.
The promulgation over the past forty years of multina-
tional instruments prohibiting the use of torture evinces a
200. Id. The plane first landed in the Dominican Republic and then proceeded
to New York. Id.
201. Id.
202. 697 F. Supp. at 1045. The court noted that "to date, the Toscanino argu-
ment, or one similar, has been rejected by the Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits .. . [a]nd no court applying Toscanino has dismissed an indictment." Id.
203. United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 275 (2d Cir.), rehg denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F.Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
204. See R. Shafer, District Court Jurisdiction Over Criminal Suspect who was Abducted in
Foreign Country and Returned to United States for Trial or Sentencing, 64 A.L.R. FED 292
(1983, 1989 Supp.). The American Law Reports (Federal) states that "[clases de-
cided in other circuits appear to give credence to the Second Circuit's views." Id. at
295; see notes 42-65 (discussing Universal Declaration and Convention on Torture);
supra notes 116-63 (describing use of Toscanino standard in various federal judicial
circuits).
205. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 273.
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worldwide commitment to eradicating the use of torturous
methods and shows the dynamic nature of international law.' °
The United States is currently a signatory to several multina-
tional treaties that prohibit the use of torture. °7 According to
the U.S. Constitution, these treaties are to be treated as part of
the supreme law of the land. ° Moreover, the Supreme Court
has ruled that maxims of international law must be considered
as a part of U.S. domestic law,2 °9 thereby compelling U.S.
courts to comply with these instruments. 0
Even if the United States was not a party to the interna-
tional human rights instruments, U.S. courts would still be
bound to observe the provisions of these documents.2 1  The
binding authority of these instruments extends to U.S. courts
because the use of torture is considered hostes humani generis,21
and it is reviled worldwide. 3 Cases involving torture invoke
the universality theory of jurisdiction, meaning that any coun-
try has the power, if not the affirmative duty, to punish any
persons who practice or utilize torturous methods in defiance
206. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 73; Convention on Torture,
supra note 17, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/
39/51; Declaration on Torture, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp.
(No. 39) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034; European Convention, supra note 17, 213
U.N.T.S. 221; Universal Declaration, supra note 17, G.A. Res. 217A, 3(1) U.N. GAOR
Res. 71, U.N. Doc. A/810.
207. See supra notes 42-82 and accompanying text (discussing various U.N. and
OAS instruments to which United States is a signatory).
208. U.S. CONST. art. VI. The U.S. Constitution also states that "[t]he judicial
power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under ... treaties made."
Id. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; see supra note 9 (discussing doctrine of incorporation).
209. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). In this case, the
Supreme Court stated that "[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascer-
tained and administered by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction." Id.
210. Id.
211. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 6; see also T. MERON, supra note 8, at 81.
Meron notes that
[s]tates parties to human rights instruments and supporters of declarations
and resolutions promulgating human rights naturally seek to promote the
universality of human rights by attempting to assure concordant behaviour
by non-parties to the instruments concerned and by states which have not
supported the adoption of the declarations and resolutions.
Id.; see infra notes 212-16 and accompanying text (discussing universal nature of in-
struments prohibiting torture).
212. See Abramovsky & Eagle, supra note 1, at 82 n.100.
213. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 1, 3.
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of the Convention on Torture and similar instruments. 1 4 In
essence, documents such as the Universal Declaration, the
Convention on Torture, and the European Convention are
treated as universally binding, requiring compliance from
states even if they have not signed nor ratified the specific in-
struments.2 ' 5 The Vienna Convention buttresses the concept
of universal application of these multinational instruments.21 6
The prohibition of torture is absolute; both the Conven-
tion on Torture and Declaration on Torture explicitly state
that no justifications may be given for the use of torture.217
The absolute prohibition of torture also appears in the Inter-
American Convention and in at least one case decided by the
European Court of Human Rights.21 Yet, some U.S. courts
continue to uphold jurisdiction over defendants apprehended
by extreme methods without inquiring into the circumstances
of arrest and detention.
2 19
One scholar noted that, if the United States ratifies the
Convention on Torture, the U.S. courts would be forced to
consider the methods used in capturing and detaining a de-
fendant. 220 Even without this ratification of the Convention on
Torture and in the absence of other international human rights
documents, U.S. domestic law requires that arresting agents
not use torturous methods when arresting fugitives. 221 The
214. See supra note 66 (discussing universality theory ofjurisdiction as applied to
torture).
215. See, e.g., notes 52-54 and accompanying text (discussing universal applica-
tions of Universal Declaration and U.N. Charter).
216. See Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 341. The
preamble to this convention regards multilateral treaties as universally binding in
order to "promote the purposes of the United Nations set forth in the Charter,
namely, the maintenance of international peace and security, the development of
friendly relations and the achievement of co-operation among nations." Id. pream-
ble, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333.
217. Convention on Torture, supra note 17, art. 2(2), G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51; Declaration on Torture, supra note
17, art. 3, G.A. Res. 3452, 30 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 34) at 91, U.N. Doc. A/10034.
218. See Inter-American Convention, supra note 73, art. 5; Ireland v. United
Kingdom, 23-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) (1976); supra notes 77, 92 and accompanying
text (defining ban against torture as being absolute).
219. See supra notes 164-202 and accompanying text (discussing circuits refusing
to apply Toscanino inquiry).
220. See M. BASSIOUNI, supra note 2, at 206; see also A Law to Light the Darkest Cell,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 16, 1990, at A34, col. 1. The U.S. Senate is currently debating
whether or not the U.S. will ratify the Convention on Torture. Id.
221. See infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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U.S. Constitution forbids the use of cruel or inhuman punish-
ment 222 and guarantees all defendants the due process of law,
both before and during trial. 22 ' Furthermore, the Restatement
(Third) reflects the prohibition of any government-sanctioned
torture.2
The long-accepted rule of Ker was that a court should not
concern itself with the circumstances of a defendant's appre-
hension and detention and that irregularities in obtaining ju-
risdiction had no ramifications on the defendant's prosecu-
tion. 25 Since Ker was decided in 1886, however, the Supreme
Court has expanded the concept of due process under the
Constitution to include procedural safeguards prior to trial, so
that a defendant is now offered protection even before the in-
ception of formal proceedings. 26 The Second Circuit recog-
nized that defendants were entitled to certain constitutional
protections once they were apprehended by U.S. agents and
devised a standard in Toscanino that prevents U.S. agents from
benefitting from their own unlawful activities.22 7
Despite this expansion of due process and the existence of
multinational treaties banning the use of torture, several U.S.
circuit courts have declined to make the Toscanino inquiry. 2
Those courts that do not undertake a Toscanino inquiry are vio-
lating the mandates of the various international instruments on
human rights. The Convention on Torture provides that
states must take measures to prosecute violators of anti-torture
instruments and that a state must undertake an examination of
any allegations and facts made available to it regarding the de-
222. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
223. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV; see United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423
(1973); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); supra note 110 and accompanying text
(discussing judicial development of due process standards).
224. See supra note 66 (discussing section 702 of Restatement (Third)).
225. See supra notes 95-102 (discussing Ker and Frisbie cases).
226. See supra note 110 (discussing expansion of due process cases to include
protections before trial).
227. See United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 274 (2d Cir.), reh 'g denied, 504
F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917 (E.D.N.Y.
1975).
228. See supra notes 164-202 and accompanying text (discussing circuits that do
not utilize Toscanino inquiry).
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fendant's apprehension and detention.2 2 9 Thus, courts within
the Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits are failing to abide
by obligations imposed by the international documents by not
engaging in a Toscanino inquiry.
Even those circuits making a Toscanino inquiry are falling
short of their duties under international law. No court has
ever divested itself of jurisdiction over a defendant after en-
gaging in a Toscanino inquiry. ° One rationale put forth in
.these decisions is that the conduct alleged did not rise to the
level of torture that is outrageous or egregious enough to war-
rant dismissal .2 3  Yet, the Special Rapporteur has defined as
torture certain of the methods of apprehension and detention
used by U.S. agents; and, accordingly, these acts require an of-
229. Convention on Torture, supra note 17, arts. 5-6, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 198, U.N. Doc. A/39/51. Article 5 provides:
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over [acts of torture] referred to in the following
cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction
or on board a ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it ap-
propriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to
establish its jurisdiction over such offenses in cases where the alleged offender is
present in any territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him.., to
any of the States mentioned in ... this article.
3. This convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in
accordance with internal law.
Id. art. 5. Article 6 provides, in pertinent part:
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available
to it, that the circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a
person alleged to have committed any offense referred to... is present shall
take him into custody or take other legal measures to ensure his presence.
2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the
facts.
Id. art. 6.
230. See supra notes 158, 202 (indicating that no court has ever divested itself of
jurisdiction in this manner).
231. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 909, 919 (D.D.C.), rev'd, 859 F.2d
953 (D.C. Cir. 1988), appeal docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989). The
other main reason advanced for the failure of courts to divest themselves ofjurisdic-
tion is that U.S. officials did not participate in or instigate the torture administered.
Id.; see United States v. Lira, 515 F.2d 68, 70-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 487
(1975); United States v. Degollado, 696 F. Supp. 1136, 1140 (S.D. Tex. 1988).
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ficial response.2 3 2
For example, in Toscanino the arresting agents allegedly
administered no less than five of the torture techniques de-
tailed in the Special Rapporteur's report, which was issued
twelve years after the Toscanino decision.2 33 The agents alleg-
edly denied the defendant adequate sleep and nourishment,
beat him, forced fluids into orifices of his body, and adminis-
tered electrical shocks to various parts of the defendant's
body.23 4 On remand, the district court failed to dismiss the
charges against the defendant because the allegations of tor-
ture were not sufficiently proven .23  The guidelines set forth
by the Special Rapporteur, however, would have required that
the court should have divested itself of jurisdiction. 36
Additionally, in Reed, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit declined to divest itself even though agents al-
legedly held a loaded gun to the defendant's head, threatened
to kill him, and forced him to lie on the floor of the plane car-
rying him from Bimini to Florida. 37 Moreover, in Cordero, the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit refused to dismiss
the defendant's indictments, holding that the defendant's
sleeping and eating conditions were not sufficiently egre-
gious. 2 8 In this case, the defendant was forced to sleep on the
floor of his prison cell and provided limited amounts of
food.23 9 Yet, the denial of both sufficient hygiene and nourish-
ment are both included in the Special Rapporteur's list of tor-
turous activities.240 Furthermore, in Yunis, arresting FBI
agents fractured both of the defendant's wrists while arresting
232. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 28-30, 119.
233. Compare United States v. Toscanino, 500 F.2d 267, 269-70 (2d Cir.), reh'g
denied, 504 F.2d 1380 (1974), motion to dismiss denied on remand, 398 F. Supp. 916, 917
(E.D.N.Y. 1975) (detailing alleged torture administered to defendant) with Report by
Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 28-30, 119
(describing various methods of torture used by sovereigns).
234. Toscanino, 500 F.2d at 270.
235. United States v. Toscanino, 398 F. Supp. 916 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
236. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 28-30, 119 (describing torture techniques warranting official action).
237. United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 902 (2d Cir. 1981).
238. United States v. Cordero, 668 F.2d 32, 37 (1st Cir. 1981).
239. Id.
240. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 29-30, 119.
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him and then failed to give his injuries proper treatment for
five days.24' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia refused to divest itself of jurisdiction, 242 despite the
Special Rapporteur's characterization of denial of medical
assistance as torture.243
The use of the Toscanino standard is important in two re-
spects-it reflects the goals of the various human rights instru-
ments and recognizes the importance that the U.S. system
places on due process. One factor weighing against divest-
ment under the Toscanino inquiry, however, is the courts' insis-
tence on considering the interests of the individual only after
those of the invaded country.244 Under this form of analysis,
the U.S. courts have held that an individual does not have
standing to protest his abduction and subsequent treatment if
the invaded country has not undertaken a similar complaint.24 5
The 1982 advisory opinion of the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights, however, provides that states undertake obliga-
tions toward individuals, not only to other sovereigns.246
Thus, it may be possible for a court to rule that an individual
may bring an action even where his asylum or native country
has not already done so.
The U.S. government has attempted to justify its use of
extraordinary apprehensions by pointing to the failure of the
extradition process.247 Worldwide tensions regarding narcot-
241. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 913-15 (D.C. Cir. 1988), appeal
docketed, No. 89-3208 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 30, 1989).
242. Id. at 915.
243. See Report by Special Rapporteur, supra note 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15,
at 30, 119.
244. See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing individual's lack of
standing in extraordinary apprehensions).
245. Id.; see United States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 67 (2d Cir.
1975) (defendant had no ability to protest abduction as both country of citizenship
and asylum country failed to formally protest).
246. Advisory Opinion OC-2/82, supra note 80, INTER-AM CT. H.R., JUDGE-
MENTS AND OPINIONS (ser. A), No. 2, at 16.
247. VAN DEN WIJNGAERT, THE POLITICAL OFFENSE EXCEPTION TO EXTRADITION
154 (1980). The author wrote that "[glenerally, most 'western countries' are willing
to extradite terrorists among themselves, whereas many Afro-Asian countries are
fundamentally opposed to extradition and accordingly, have become asylum havens
for terrorists from all over the world." Id. In addition, some of the countries in
which terrorists and narcotics traffickers seek asylum do not have extradition treaties
with the United States. See Engleberg, Terrorism Trial in U.S. Moves Minor Actor to
Center Stage, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1989, at A10, col. 2; see also Engleberg, U.S. Is Said to
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ics trafficking and terrorism are increasing, and countries that
historically have complied with extradition requests have now
refused to cooperate.2 48 The need for unilateral action, how-
Weigh Abducting Terrorists Abroad for Trials Here, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1986, at 10, col. 4;
supra note 4 (discussing extradition generally).
248. See, e.g., Tagliabue, 4 Hijackers Charged by Italy With Murder And Kidnapping; 2
P.LO. Officers Taken To Rome, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 6. Two recent cases
that underscored the inability of the United States to gain cooperation from its tradi-
tional allies in extradition matters involved suspected terrorists Mohammed Abbas
and Mohammed Hamadei. Abbas was the leader of a terrorist group that hijacked
the Achilke Lauro, an Italian cruise ship, and murdered Leon Klinghoffer, an elderly,
wheelchair-bound U.S. citizen. Dionne, Hostage's Death: 'A Shot to Forehead', N.Y.
Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6. The hijackers surrendered to Egyptian authori-
ties, who were to fly the hijackers to safety in Tunisia. Weinraub, 'We Want Justice,'
Reagan Declares, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1985, at 1, col. 5. Israeli intelligence learned of
the plan and alerted the U.S. government, which then used U.S. Naval planes to in-
tercept the hijackers' plane and force it to land in Sicily. Gwertzman, U.S. Intercepts Jet
Carrying Hijackers; Fighters Divert It To NA TO Base In Italy; Gunmen Face Trial In Slaying Of
Hostage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 1985, at Al, col. 6. Despite an immediate U.S. request
for the hijackers' extradition, Italian authorites refused to surrender the perpetrators
and instead chose to try them in Italy. Emerson, Taking on Terrorists, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Sept. 12, 1988, at 32. One of the hijackers was eventually convicted by
the Italian court and sentenced to thirty years imprisonment, but Abbas was permit-
ted to fly to safety. Id.
In January, 1987, West German authorities apprehended Mohammed Hamadei,
suspected leader of the hijacking in 1987 of a Trans World Airlines jet that left U.S.
Navy diver Robert Stethem dead. Markham, Hijacking Suspect Arrested By Bonn, N.Y.
Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at A l, col. 3. Hijackers seized control of the plane and held its
passengers hostage after the flight left Athens, Greece, onJune 14, 1985, and forced
the plane to remain on the runway in Beirut Airport for seventeen days. Id. at A8,
col. 5. Forty U.S. citizens were aboard the plane, and the hijackers murdered
Stethem and dumped his body onto the runway. Markham, Bonn May Balk at Extradit-
ing Terror Suspect, N.Y. Times, Jan. 17, 1987, at 6, col. 2.
U.S. officials immediately requested Hamadei's extradition, but West German
authorities refused-West German law did not permit the imposition of the death
penalty, and authorities sought assurances from the U.S. that Hamadei would not be
subjected to capital punishment. Id. U.S. officials agreed to this condition, but the
West Germans still refused to surrender Hamadei after two West German citizens
were abducted in Lebanon. Shenon, U.S. Will Not Seek Death In Hijacking, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 19, 1987, at AS, col. 1. West German authorities feared that extraditing
Hamadei to the United States would incur a "death sentence" for the hostages.
Markham, Bonn Hesitates On Extraditing Terror Suspect, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1987, at AI,
col. 5.
Hamadei was later sentenced to life imprisonment in West Germany, but some
U.S. leaders voiced contempt for the actions of the West German government. See
Roberts, 'No Deal'For Accused Hijacker, Bonn Assures, N.Y. Times,June 25, 1987, at A9,
col. 1;Justice for Flight 847, TIME, May 29, 1989, at 63. It was later reported that the
French government had an opportunity to arrest Hamadei several months before he
was apprehended in West Germany. The West reels in 'a bigfish' at last, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Jan. 26, 1987, at 14. Despite having information that the hijacker was
entering their country, however, the French authorities did not take any action nor
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ever, should not permit the use of excessive or torturous meth-
ods in securing a suspect's capture and detention.
The defendant in Reed charged that the U.S. government
was contradicting its stated concern for human rights by partic-
ipating in extraordinary apprehensions. 49 The U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed, noting that there
was no pattern of repeated apprehensions in disregard of in-
ternational law.2 50 Despite this assertion, recent events indi-
cate otherwise, and, in fact, the United States has increasingly
resorted to such abductions overseas.2 5 ' The increasing
number of defendants captured abroad and brought to trial in
the United States might be a valid response to failed extradi-
tion requests but also should require that U.S. courts inquire
into the methods used by apprehending agents in order to
conform to frequently stated concerns for human rights.
CONCLUSION
The standards set forth in instruments barring the use of
torture are merely a codification of customary standards with
which all states should comply. The United States is a party to
several of these instruments and, moreover, is recognized
worldwide as a leader in the advancement of human rights.
U.S. courts, however, permit the unlawful activities of agents
to go unrecognized by refusing to divest themselves of juris-
diction where a defendant has been captured abroad through
torture or ill-treatment. The Toscanino inquiry recognizes that,
U.S. agents should not be permitted to benefit from unlawful
conduct. U.S. courts should apply this inquiry more strin-
gently and in accordance with the guidelines set forth by the
Special Rapporteur if the United States is to maintain its posi-
tion as a leader of democracy and human rights.
Andrew M. Wolfenson*
notify U.S. officials due to their fear of reprisals against French citizens being held
hostage in Lebanon. Id.
249. See United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 903 (2d Cir. 1981).
250. Id.
251. See supra notes 116-202 and accompanying text (describing cases in which
authorities abducted defendants abroad).
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